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Mortgage Lending Policies of Financial
Intermediaries
Beginnings of Mortgage Lending
THE mortgage is the oldest form of debt instrument still in wide use and,
hence, among the oldest forms of investment available to financial insti-
It was already well developed in the Roman era, with the rights
of borrower and lender clearly defined, and evolved through English
common law and German courts into the mortgage instrument of today.
The Roman hypotheca is considered to be the direct forebear of the modern
mortgage ifl which the borrower retains title, possession, and use of his land
and property contingent upon fulfillment of his mortgage obligation. This
is not to suggest that the modern mortgage is a uniform, simple document.
Quite the contrary.Differences in mortgage law and practice persist
throughout the United States, mortgage instruments continue to be cum-
bersonie and costly, and foreclosure proceedings lengthy and expensive.
The wide diversity of practice among states is and includes
important variations regarding borrowers' rights of redemption, deficiency
judgments, foreclosure costs and procedures, and lenders' rights in event
of default. The several attempts that have been made over the years, since
the early part of the twentieth century, to unify and simplify the variety of
state mortgage laws and procedures have all met with failure.' The free
flow of mortgage funds across state lines is, therefore, still impeded by the
complexities and variations of state mortgage laws.2 In the earliest days of
American real estate finance individuals were the main source of mortgage
funds, joined somewhat later by private banking houses and specialized
private land banks.Despite the early and widespread failures of land
banks, similar institutions were organized in the early nineteenth century
to lend on farm mortgages. These also were generally unsuccessful, and
throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries "individual
'See Richard U. Ratcliff, Urban Land Economics, New York, 1949, pp. 218ff; Miles L.
Colean, The Impact of Government on Real Estate Finance in the United States, New York,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950, Chap. 3; and Henry Hoagland, Real
Estate Finance, Homewood, Ill.,1954, pp. 17ff., for discussion of attempts to develop
uniform mortgage laws.
2See,for example, two papers in The Mortgage Banker; Earl B. Schwulst, "Needed
Now: Uniform Laws for Out-of-State Mortgage Investing," June 1956, p. 22; and John
J. Redlield, "Problems Facing Savings Banks in Out-of-State Mortgage Purchases,"
January 1956, pp. 36—41.
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lenders remained the principal source of credit, and, in spite of Hamilton's
admonitions on the incompatibility of mortgage paper with the require-
ments of commercial banking, state-chartered commercial banks, from the
beginning of the Republic, were heavily involved in loans on both farm
and town property."3
Beginning in the early part of the nineteenth century, other types of
financial intermediaries—mutual savings banks, life insurance companies,
savings and loan associations (then called building societies)—developed
to broaden the sources of funds available for mortgage financing. An
additional source was provided after 1863 by the formation of national
banks, though they were limited in that function by severe legal restric-
tions.Participation by these diverse types of financial institutions in
mortgage markets expanded over the decades, facilitated by previously
discussed factors—increased flows of savings, gradual easing of legal
restrictions, and federal programs.In the postwar decade, financial
institutions have assumed an increasingly dominant role as suppliers of
mortgage funds, and their operations have varied in the process.It is
the purpose of this chapter to appraise the mortgage lending policies
underlying operations of the main types of financial intermediaries.
Financial Intermediaries and Mortgage Markets
Among the four principal types of mortgage credit suppliers, only the
savings and loan association was organized originally for the express pur-
pose of providing long-term credit to finance real estate. The others were
organized to meet community needs for commercial credit, savings, and
insurance protection. They provided mortgage funds as a part of their
investment activities. Among the four institutions there are differences in
sources of funds and investment opportunities available to them and in
operating techniques in mortgage markets. Operational differences in-
clude: orientation towards local markets or towards national markets;
acquiring mortgages indirectly through correspondents or branch offices or
making direct loans; emphasizing permanent loans on completed proper-
ties or short-term construction lending and interim financing; lending
chiefly on individual existing properties or on large-scale new projects;
making long-term advance commitments to acquire mortgages or acquiring
completed mortgages in the market"; some concentration on feder-
ally insured or guaranteed mortgage lending or specializing in conventional
mortgage lending.These operational differences reflect, among other
' Colean, op. cit., p. 59.
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things, differences in the basic nature and purpose of financial institutions,
in the legal framework within which each type operates, in the degree of
functional specialization, and in the historical and traditional background
against: which each type developed. In addition to broad differences in
mortgage market operations, which are largely interinstitutional, impor-
tant differences exist also among institutions of the same class.
To achieve an adequate understanding of factors that influence insti-
in their investment policies and guide them in their mortgage lend-
ing field interviews were conducted. Information was supplied
by thirty-five officers in charge of mortgage departments or over-all invest-
ment policies of twenty-seven major lending institutions (most of them
located in the East). Besides the four major types of financial institutions,
they included mortgage companies, mortgage brokers, and real estate firms.
The purpose of that approach was to develop an adequate basis for report-
ing on aspects of mortgage lending policies not previously treated in the
literature, yet fundamental to residential mortgage market developments
in the first postwar decade. Material from interviews was distributed for
review and appraisal among students of financial markets in government,
univeTsities, and research organizations, and later discussed and evaluated
in the light of known market developments and available data. The mate-
rial thus developed and analyzed is the basis of the following discussion of
broad, aspects of investment policy and of similarities and differences
among lender groups. As in earlier chapters, some pertinent historical
baclwrouncl is sketched in.4
Insurance Companies
When life insurance companies were in their infancy and their assets very
small "...the dominant investment by all odds was mortgage loans,
comprising 80 to 90 per cent of invested assets. The only other invest-
ments. .werestate and city bonds, and a few bank stocks. There were no
corporate securities whatever, and there was a relatively high percentage
The reader may wish to supplement the discussion in this chapter by reference to the
following works: Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in
Real Estate:Trends and Prospects, Princeton University Press for National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1956; Carl F. Behrens, Commercial Ban/c Activities in Urban
Mortg2ge Financing, 1952; R. J. Saulnier, Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance G'orn-
1950;and Ernest M. Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets: Characteristics and Financing,
1951 (all published by the National Bureau of Economic Research); W. H. Steiner,
"Institutional Investments," Law and Contemporary Problems, Durham, N.C., 1952; John
Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks in the Savings and Mortgage Markets, Cambridge, Mass., 1948;
Erwin W. Boemler, Roland I. Robinson, Frank H. Gane, and Loring C. Farwell,Financial
Ins€iit4tions, Homewood, Ill., 1956.
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of cash."5 Investment portfolios of life insurance companies have shifted
markedly during the past century in response to a changing economic
environment, modification of insurance investment laws, and avail-
ability of new capital market instruments. Mortgages have never again
dominated the asset structure of those companies as they did in the early
history of the industry, when mortgages were preferred because they
were more familiar, and because other investments, now regular com-
ponents of insurance company portfolios, were prohibited by strict
investment laws.6 Since the turn of the century, the share of mortgages
in total assets has varied from a high of over two-fifths in the mid-twenties
to a low of about one-seventh at the end of World War II. The rapid
rise in life insurance company mortgage investments during the postwar
decade brought the ratio to over one-third by the end of 1956.If farm
mortgages are excluded, the 1956 ratio—about 31 per cent—is the highest
for nonfarm mortgages in this century.7
FACTORS IN MORTGAGE INVESTMENT DECISIONS
As mortgage credit suppliers, life insurance companies differ from other
institutional investors in several important ways:(1) they have more
alternative long-term investment opportunities; (2) they operate generally
within a more liberal legal framework; (3) they acquire a larger portion
of their mortgages from other mortgage originators;(4) they emphasize
different types of mortgage investments; and (5) their mortgage holdings
are more concentrated among a small number of companies. Important
differences in investment policy and practice exist among individual life
insurance companies, as well as between them and other types of investors.
With a wide choice among alternative long-term investments, how do
life insurance companies determine the amount of funds they will allocate
for investment in mortgages during any one period? The impact on mort-
gage markets of changes in life insurance company investment programs
makes the answer significant. The answer is not simple nor the same for
George T. Conklin, Jr., "A Century of Life Insurance Portfolio Management,"
Chapter XIV in David McCahan, ed., Investment of Life Insurance Funds, Philadelphia,
1953, p. 263.
6Ibid.,p. 207.
Farm mortgages were an important part of life insurance company portfolios in
earlier years, particularly in the early 1920's following the upsurge in farm production
during World War I with the rising demand for farm mortgage credit. The trend away
from farm mortgages began with the collapse of farm prices in the 1920's and accelerated
during the widespread farm failures of the 1930's.Since then farm mortgages have
comprised a Very minor part of insurance company assets.
For a summary history of insurance company mortgage investments, see Conklin, pp.
266—270, and Saulnier, op. cit., pp. 1—15; for a more detailed discussion, see Grebler, Blank,
and Winnick, op. cii., pp. 199—201.
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all types of companies. One leading life insurance executive answered
the question in this way: "The investment officers of life insurance
companies, conditioned by the internal requirements and characteristics
of their industry as well as by legal requirements, seek primarily fixed
debt obligations of longer term which are protected by an adequate
demonstrated earning capacity and by a sufficient equity risk cushion.
They face the demands of our economy for this type of capital and
invest in those fields which, risk considered, return the highest net Without
question, the best yield obtainable consistent with risk is a paramount
factor in the investment decisions for all companies. For some companies
it appears to be the only factor, as Conklin suggests. For others, however,
maximization of yield is not always decisive.Its importance in determin-
ing the flow of mortgage funds from life insurance companies usually
varies with the size of company, the nature of its mortgage portfolio, and
its method of acquiring mortgage loans.
The most important single consideration besides yield influencing mort-
gage flow is the stability and efficiency of the organizations established
for the acquisition and servicing of new mortgage business.It is funda-
mental, particularly to the very large companies administering substantial
mortgage portfolios on a nationwide basis through extensive correspondent
or branch office systems.9Those mortgage lending organizations or
correspondents had been largely disrupted, as noted previously, by the
decline in real estate and mortgage activity during the 1930's and by
World War II restrictions. After the war, companies hastened to establish
new field organizations, in themselves considered valuable assets.To
maintain loyal, efficient, and stable field organizations, companies allo-
cate an amount of funds for mortgages considered irreducible before
committing for other investments.Regardless of yield, therefore, those
companies are committed to at least minimum mortgage programs, until
a radical change is made in their way of doing business.
Companies that chose to establish nationwide systems of branch offices
rather than correspondents for the acquisition and servicing of mortgages
(of which there are only two large ones) are perhaps even more firmly
committed to basic mortgage programs by their large overhead costs of
operation. One large company, for example, which shifted to a branch
office system when many of its independent correspondents failed during
the 1930's, had decided to maintain an active mortgage program before
Conklin, op. cit., p. 261.
For a discussion of correspondent and branch office systems and of mortgage lending
organizations of life insurance companies see Saulnier, op. cit., pp. 28—36.
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committing itself to the high fixed costs of branch mortgage offices.It now
has well over two-fifths of its assets in mortgages (the industry average,
about one-third) and intends to increase that ratio.
Beyond the minimum amounts of mortgage flows maintained by the
large companies, the volume of additional funds allocated by them depends
essentially upon mortgage yields relative to other investment yields.
Further, within the mortgage sector, shifts in favor of mortgages yielding
the highest current return are common. Market conditions, however, may
not permit the full adjustment desired by the largest companies. Insofar
as possible, for example, in the residential mortgage sector shifts are made
from federally underwritten mortgages bearing inflexible rates to con-
ventional mortgages when free rates rise in a tightening capital market.
The larger insurance companies are faced also with the practical prob-
lem of investing large sums of money year in, year out.It is not easy for
them to maximize yields or to move into and out of mortgage markets
rapidly in response to changing conditions. The cost, moreover, associated
with the operation of separate mortgage, bond, and other investment
departments leads to a policy of portfolio diversification not always con-
sistent with yield.
The smaller companies, with fewer funds to be placed in capital markets,
with correspondents not heavily dependent upon them for business, and
with one integrated investment department, operate typically with a higher
degree of investment flexibility than the large companies. They can allo-
cate funds to different sectors of the capital market on the basis of relative
yield alone. While their mortgage correspondents are usually permitted
to reinvest proceeds from mortgage repayments, additional advance allo-
cations are usually not made. Instead, funds are committed for mortgages
as correspondents submit applications for approval, leaving room for flexi-
bility as capital market yields change. The chief investment officer of a
moderate-sized company probably spoke for many in stating, "The only
real factor influencing my investment policy is relative yield."
Two other elements that play a role in life insurance company invest-
ment policy are the percentage ratio of mortgages to total assets, and the
human factor.Several companies, for example, operate within a longer-
range policy which tends to set a maximum for mortgage expansion (or
minimum for reduction). Having reached their goals those companies
invest only that amount of new funds which will maintain their mortgage
portfolios at the desired relationship to total assets, until the goals may be
changed. The human factor obviously often plays an indeterminate but
important part in the allocation of investment funds. A strong-minded
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person with long years of experience at the head of a mortgage department
may get more funds for his department than a younger, less experienced
One executive, forty-five years in the business and twenty years
as head of the mortgage loan department, characterized himself as a
who battled for his "share of company funds even though yields
turn temporarily against me." Such a man has an influence on mortgage
loan policy quite apart from economic considerations.
MORTGAGE LENDING POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Among companies there is wide variation in types of mortgage activities,
though nearly all devote a significant share of assets to mortgage invest-
ments. Some, usually the smaller ones, concentrate on home mortgage
loans, and others on large loans secured by income-producing properties,
both residential and commercial. Most companies operate between the
extremes, investing broadly in both owner-occupied home mortgages—
conventional and federally underwritten—and income property loans.
The same holds true for operations of life insurance companies more than
a decade earlier.'0 The VA-guaranteed loan has been an added feature
in most life insurance company mortgage portfolios since early 1946,
tending to give them greater volatility.
Most mortgage operations of companies that lend in volume on residen-
tial nlortgages are in permanent financing of new large-scale housing
projects. Financing individual transactions for new or existing properties
is better suited to local institutions familiar with local markets and with
direct handling of individual transactions than to life insurance companies
operating on a nationwide basis through correspondents. Large companies
often handle permanent financing of commercial and industrial properties
involving large sums of money directly through their home offices. Such
loans are frequently secured by both existing and new structures.
During the first postwar decade portfolios of life insurance companies as
a group showed a steady trend away from mortgages on rental and com-
mercial properties and in favor of home mortgages (Chart 23). That trend
is in keeping with the proportionately greater postwar demand for funds to
finance single-family home construction.Nevertheless,life insurance
companies continued throughout that time to be the chief single supplier of
mortgage funds on commercial properties and a major supplier of funds
for multifamily properties (Chapter 2).
In view of the nature of life insurance business and investment needs,
most companies extend so-called permanent long-term mortgage financing,
Saulnier, op.cit., p.30.
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rather than short-term funds to finance construction. They are closely
associated with financing construction, however, lending mainly on new
properties and usually arranging for acquisition of permanent mortgages
CHART23
















By Type ofProperty By Type ofMortgage
Kiaman, Volume of Mortgage Debt, Table 17.
before construction begins. Company policies vary,chiefly between the
long-range mortgage acquisition techniques of the larger companies, with
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of mOst smaller companies that prefer to enter and withdraw from the
mortgage market according to market conditions. Among the larger corn-
too, there are variations within the process of long-range planning
of investment programs.
Planning its mortgage program at least a year ahead, a large company
interested in residential mortgages usually makes allocations of funds to
mortgage companies, of which it may have nationwide connections with
more than a hundred. The mortgage companies initiate loans and submit
them to the life insurance company for prior approval before completion.
Upon its approval, the company issues firm commitments to acquire such
loans at a stated price when completed and ready for devliery." A
variation of this technique developed in recent years is the "forward
commitment," by which the company agrees to purchase completed
mortgages, not when ready for delivery, but at any time within some
stated period, often eighteen months or two years after the commitment
date. Some companies arrange to delay the taking up of commitments
for three months or so after loans are ready for delivery. The forward
commitment requires mortgage correspondents to arrange for interim
financing from commercial banks beyond the time normally required to
close loans and deliver them to the investing company.12
The process of planning mortgage investment activity for a year or two
ahead and allocating and committing funds for future acquisition of mort-
gages necessarily reduces the companies' ability to adjust to short-term
changes in market conditions. In particular, movements toward expansion
are considerably more feasible than toward contraction of mortgage acti-
vity in the short run. Commitments are usually binding on the investor,
and while allocations of funds may be withdrawn or reduced, most large
companies are reluctant to take such action. Some flexibility in program-
ming is maintained during the year by allocating funds on a six-month
than on a full-year basis. Also, some unallocated funds are usually
retained for investment opportunities likely to arise during the year. Re-
duced flexibility is partly compensated for by the advantages of operational
programming inherent in the longer-range mortgage acquisition technique.
Larger companies consider continuity of operations more essential than
maximized yields at all times. Development of the forward commitment
technique represents a further step in their efforts to smooth the flow of
funds into mortgages.
11.SeeChapter 8 for a discussion of the relationship between life insurance companies
and companies.
12SeeChapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the forward commitment and interim
techniques.
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Besides reduction in investment flexibility, the large institutional inves-
tor using the technique just described is faced with important operating
problems: (1) long and uncertain time lags between decisions and com-
mitments to invest and the actual disbursement of funds; (2) an uncertain
rate of attrition in commitments; and (3) danger of overcommitment
when changes in market conditions may supervene.
Time lags between the policy decision to invest a certain amount of
funds in mortgages, the commitment of those funds, and the acquisition of
the mortgages vary widely between companies and by type of property
financed. On new residential construction the typical lag between com-
mitment and mortgage acquisition may be between 6 and 12 months, on
new commercial construction as long as 18 to 24 months, but on existing
properties as short as between 3 and 6 months. The lapse of time between
the initial allocation of funds (before firm commitment) and disbursement
is, of course, somewhat longer. The timing of acquisitions and hence of the
actual need for ready funds in the mortgage market is far less certain than
in the market for corporate securities.(Arrangements for direct place-
ments of corporate bonds between borrower and investor, for example, are
quite definite as to dates so that the time of acquisition can be carefully
planned.)
The significant but varying rate of attrition in mortgage commitments,
and other phenomena without close parallel in long-term corporate finan-
cing, complicate planning of mortgage investments. Mortgage commit-
rnents may not be taken up because of unforeseen developments:(1)
scheduled construction may be deferred;(2) mortgage loans may be
smaller than commited for or entirely unnecessary;(3) funds for com-
pleted mortgages may be obtained elsewhere on more favorable terms
under changing market conditions.
Experience of one of the largest American companies, for example, has
been that nearly one-fifth of Its mortgage commitments are not taken up.
The proportion has varied widely between two-fifths and less than one-
tenth, the rate being related to the relative attractiveness of terms on
outstanding commitments compared with those available on new commit-
ments. During the year beginning in the autumn of 1953, for example,
when capital markets eased and interest rates declined, builders and mort-
gage companies were able to obtain new commitments or market their
completed loans at far better prices than those already set under firm
commitments. Lapse of commitments entailed the loss of only the commit-
ment fee which was less than the spread between mortgage prices currently
available and the prices arranged for under previous commitments.
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During 1955—1956, on the other hand, when capital markets were tighten-
ing and new commitments were hard to come by, the attrition rate on
outstanding commitments dropped sharply.
The typical rate of disbursement of mortgage funds after the date of
commitment, based on the records of one large company, is shown in two
panels of Chart 24. The data in panel A show that the rate of disburse-
ment increases rapidly through the second month following commitment.
Thereafter, the rate declines gradually through the twelfth month. Only
a little more than 5 per cent of mortgage funds are disbursed in succeeding
months. The cumulative disbursement curve in panel B indicates that
typically about 85 per cent of committed mortgage funds are actually
disbursed, and that over three-fifths of the committed amount is disbursed
by the end of the eighth month.
During periods when funds are plentiful, financial markets easy, and
competition among investors for mortgages keen, life insurance companies
(as well as other types of lenders) may overcommit themselves in the mort-
gage market. The uncertainties of time lags and attrition associated with
commitments, coupled with the need to keep large sums of money invested,
have sometimes led investors to have a volume of commitments outstanding
too large to be met comfortably from expected receipts. This problem of
large institutional investors operating extensive nationwide mortgage
programs through mortgage correspondents or branch offices was high-
lighted by the experience of one of the largest life insurance companies at
the end of 1954.It had commitments outstanding about equal to the
amount of funds anticipated for total mortgage investments during 1955,
which meant that no new allocations or commitments could be made to
acquire mortgages during the year. Thereupon, the company obtained
short-term funds from commercial banks in a much publicized "ware-
transaction, in which the company sold a large block of its
mortgages to be repurchased within one year.'3
Co rnpanies less in favor of the allocation and commitment process—
usualty the smaller ones—avoid the uncertain timing of mortgage flows
associated with the regular commitment process and the short-term inflexi-
bilities imposed by the long-range forward commitment process. They are
not completely committed to a mortgage program and so take advantage
of it or not according to changing capital market conditions. One moder-
ate-sized company attempts to forecast mortgage interest rates at least
six months to a year ahead, to be in a position to acquire higher-yield
See Chapter 7 for further discussion of this type of warehousing in relation to other
types.
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CHART24
Percentage Distribution:Typical Life Insurance Company Disbursement
of Mortgage Funds Following Month of Commitment
Percent A. Percentage Disbursement in Each Month
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SOURCE:The records of a large eastern life insurance company; the distribution is
based on experience with loans of less than $50,000 on new and existing properties. See
Table A—i 1 below.
mortgages and avoid having a large volume of outstanding commitments
on lower-yield ones. An even greater degree of flexibility is secured by
some smaller companies that acquire a substantial portion of their mort-
gages directly rather than through correspondents. In general, however,
most smaller and moderate-sized companies acquire the bulk of their
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mortgages on the basis of prior commitments through mortgage correspon-
dents and hence are subject to many of the uncertainties in timing mort-
gage flows that beset large companies.
Regardless of asset size or type of mortgage operation all life insurance
companies alike were faced with the need for basic changes in investment
policy after March 1951. Before the Federal Reserve-Treasury "accord"
there was no need to allocate funds for mortgage investment. The general
policy was to invest as much money in mortgages as the market would take.
Maximum flexibility was permitted by unlimited access to the government
securities market, supported by Federal Reserve. The change in monetary
and fiscal policy required companies to allocate their funds carefully
among alternative investments in accordance with their anticipated in-
come. The large companies, therefore, adopted the allocation technique
for acquiring mortgages. The day of pouring funds into markets for mort-
gages and corporate securities closed with the "accord." Almost without
exception life insurance companies, and other institutional investors too,
consider March 1951 to be the turning point of investment policy and
operating techniques in postwar mortgage markets.
Mutual Savings Banks
Mutual savings banks are the oldest of American thrift institutions, dating
from :. 816.Organized primarily in industrial areas to encourage thrift
among working class groups, these institutions spread rapidly through the
eastern part of the country. They have remained geographically concen-
trated in the New England and Middle Atlantic States, and are relatively
few in number. The little over 500 mutual savings banks in seventeen
states compare with over 13,000 commercial banks, 6,000 savings and loan
associations, and 1,000 life insurance companies spread over the country.
The mutual savings banks, though growing tremendously in size over
the years, have continued to serve their original function of providing an
outlet for the funds of small savers. Their quasi-philanthropic origins have
determined and maintained their investment policies as designed princi-
pally to safeguard depositors' funds. As a result, they have achieved a
record of safety over nearly a century and a half unparalleled by other
types of financial institutions.It is important to understand the nature
and o:rigins of mutual savings banks in order to understand the investment
policies followed by these institutions.'4
14Amongthe best references on mutual savings banks are John Lintner, Mutual Savings
Banks in Size Savings and Mortgage Markets, Cambridge, Mass., 1948; and W. H. Steiner,
"MutualSavingsBanks," Law and Contemporary Problems, Durham, N.C., 1952.
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FACTORS IN MORTGAGE INVESTMENT DECISIONS
Mutual savings banks are more limited in their investment outlets than
either life insurance companies or commercial banks, but less so than
savings and loan associations.Since there are no federally chartered
savings banks, each of them is limited in its investments according to the
legal restrictions imposed by the state in which it operates. For the pro-
tection of depositors most savings bank states restrict investments to a
"legal list" intended to insure a high degree of safety and liquidity. These
lists have been modified and generally expanded in all states over the years.
Within those legal limits, savings bankers tend to choose investment
policies to secure for their banks maximum net returns after due allowances
for costs and risks on different types of investments.'5 While investments in
corporate securities have been fairly narrowly circumscribed, mortgages
have always been considered suitable investments for savings banks, sub-
ject, of course, to geographic limitations, and other bounds set, particularly
on terms of lending and proportion of assets.Thus, in each year as far
back as records are available until the outbreak of World War II, mort-
gage loans constituted the savings banks' largest single category of assets,
never falling below one-third of total resources.16
During World War II, savings banks invested more heavily than other
1:ypes of financial institutions did in U.S. government securities relative to
i:heir total assets. Their mortgage holdings declined to one-fourth of assets
by the end of 1945, the lowest percentage on record. Partly because of the
restricted geographic mortgage market available to savings banks, their
mortgage holdings continued to decline relative to other assets in the
immediate postwar years. After the 1949 and 1950 changes in investment
laws governing out-of-state mortgage acquisitions(discussed below),
savings banks as a group rapidly increased their mortgage holdings to
nearly three-fifths of assets by the end of 1956, a larger proportion than the
previous record in the 1920's.
The postwar investment policy of savings banks has, of course, varied
among individual banks, particularly between larger banks that have
sought out-of-state mortgage investments to employ their deposits, and
small banks that have been able to keep their funds invested locally.
Nearly all, however, showed a strong preference for mortgages in the first
postwar decade. The generally higher yields on mortgages relative to
Lintner, op. cit., p. 215. His Chapter VIII provides a full discussion of investment
policies and shifts in portfolio composition of savings banks.
RaymondW. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Princeton University
Press, 1955, Vol. I, Table L-29, page 415; Lintner, op. cit., p. 299.
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other investments available to them in the East attracted a steadily in-
creasing share of savings bank funds. The consequently higher rate of
paid on deposits has enabled savings banks to meet the increased
competition for savings from other types of financial intermediaries.
In addition to the yield advantage of mortgages during most postwar
years, federal mortgage underwriting and regular amortization have
endowed mortgage investments with a high degree of safety and liquidity,
invest:rnent criteria essential to savings banks. For many savings banks,
therefore, postwar investment policy has been relatively uncomplicated—
to acquire the maximum amount of mortgages consistent with deposit
inflows, statutory requirements, and liquidity needs. Of the seventeen
savings bank states at the end of 1956 eleven had from over two-fifths to
over two-thirds of their assets in mortgages, and the banks in five of the
remaining six states had over one-third in mortgages. In several states,
FHA and VA loans are exempt from statutory limits on mortgage holdings,
which leaves ample room for further expansion in that investment area.
Self-imposed limitations and relative yield changes in later postwar years,
however, could well slow down—at least temporarily—the rate of mort-
gage acquisitions by mutual savings banks.
MORTGAGE LENDING POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Savings bank mortgage lending policies and practices in some ways lie
between those of savings and loan associations and life insurance corn-
In other ways they are unique.Traditionally and by design,
mutual savings banks, like savings and loan associations, have supplied
funds chiefly to satisfy the needs of their own local mortgage markets.
The changes in state statutes of recent postwar years, however, have opened
to them the field of national mortgage lending, hitherto the domain of life
insurance companies. Their formulation of mortgage programs, methods
of mortgage acquisition, and types of mortgage investments, however, are
in large measure peculiar to them.
Wh ether operating in local or out-of-state mortgage markets, or investing
in new or existing, residential or commercial, properties, savings banks
generally do not plan their mortgage programs as far ahead as the large
life insurance companies do. The regularity of life insurance premium
income permits long-range planning of investment, unique among financial
intermediaries. The net movements of savings deposits to which mortgage
investments must be geared, however, are rather irregular and unpredict-
able. For internal guidance the larger savings banks often project mort-
gage investment programs for a year or eighteen months ahead on the
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basis of the expected inflow of deposits. Allocations of funds for mortgage
acquisition are made on the basis of the minimum expected inflow of
deposits and of mortgage repayments and are reviewed each month in the
light of actual deposits and mortgage availability. Additional funds from
increased deposits or prepayments are committed to the mortgage market
as they become available.
While most savings banks do not maintain as close an organizational
relationship with correspondents as life insurance companies do, they
frequently use the secondary market to acquire mortgages for immediate
delivery (i.e., within ninety days) rather than under long-range prior
commitments. Occasionally they buy from other institutional investors
that wish to sell seasoned mortgages to obtain funds for new loans. The
flexibility thus maintained is valuable in permitting adjustments both to
changing deposit inflows and to changing capital market yields.
Without question the most significant single development influencing
savings banks' postwar mortgage operations was the frequently mentioned
amending of most state statutes in 1949 and 1950 on out-of-state lending.
Through this legislation, limited essentially to FHA and VA mortgages,
mutual savings banks, many of which had more funds to invest in mort-
gages than could be absorbed by local markets at prevailing interest rates,
entered the national market. And the harvest was ripe. Savings banks—
located chiefly in the capital surplus areas of the East—had been providing
a steadily decreasing share of mortgage funds compared with other insti-
tutional investors because building and real estate activity was increasing
less in New England and the Middle Atlantic states than in other sectors
of the country, and their access to the widening VA loan market had been
severely restricted.In their local markets competition with savings and
loan associations was keen. From 1950 on savings banks accounted for a
steadily growing share of total mortgage investments (Chapters 2 and 5).
In the "non-savings bank" states and capital shortage areas now open to
them expanding real estate and construction markets created large demands
(br funds and higher mortgage yields than those in the Northeast. The
growth of out-of-state mortgage business was spectacular for mutual
savings banks in Massachusetts and New York. At the end of 1956, banks
in these two states accounted for four-fifths of the total amount of mortgage
loans held by all mutual savings banks.
Of the total new mortgage loans acquired by New York State savings
banks in 1955, almost one-half were on out-of-state properties, compared
with a little over one-fourth in 1950, and only 3 per cent in 1946
(Table 14). The sharp increase was accounted for entirely by out-of-state
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purchases of VA loans, which rose from one-half of one per cent of total
mortgage acquisitions of New York State savings banks in 1950 to almost
two-fifths in 1955, and represented two-thirds of all VA loans acquired by
those banks during the year. Out-of-state purchases of FHA loans in those
years were declining.'7Similar data on gross mortgage acquisitions are
TABLE 14
Mortgage Loans Acquired by New York State Mutual Savings
Banks Within the State and Out-of-State, 1946—1955
AMOUNTS (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) PERCENTAGERATIOS
(4) as(5) as
%of%of
N.Y. (3) as(4) as(5) asTotalTotal
TotalState Out-of-StateLoans % of% of% ofFHA VA
YEARLoansLoansTotalFHAVA (1) (1) (1) LoansLoans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1946424 410 14 14 — 3.3 3.3 — 77.8
1947 566 538 28 28 4.9 4.9 — 52.8
1948 745 621 124 124 — 16.6 16.6 — 52.5
19491,001 798 203203 — 20.320.3 — 49.5 —
19501,7341,241 493484 9 28.427.9 0.558.0 4.1
19511,6301,040 590529 61 36.232.5 3.766.0 18.7
19521,483 955 528365 163 35.624.6 11.064.040.8
19531,603 961 642258 38440.0 16.024.067.054.5
19542,0221,138 884217 667 43.7 10.733.061.062.5
19552,4421,2941,148211 93747.0 8.638.452.267.2
SOURCE: From unpublished records of New York State Banking Department.
not rcadily available for Massachusetts or for other states where mutual
savings banks are located. Data obtained on mortgage holdings of a large
Massachusetts savings bank, however, reveal a similar trend, with out-of-
state mortgages accounting for well over one-third of its total mortgage
holdings in 1955 compared with less than one-sixth five years earlier.
Distribution of outstanding mortgages between intrastate and out-of-
state loans for all mutual savings banks is shown in Table 15. Out-of-state
mortgage holdings increased from 25 to 28 per cent of total mortgage
holdings from September 30, 1954 to December 31, 1955. VA loans
accounted for the bulk of the increase, with such out-of-state ]oans
Before changes in some state laws permitting out-of-state lending on VA and FHA
mortgages, New York State had authorized savings banks to lend on conventional and
FHA mortgages in adjoining states. Table 14, showing FHA out-of-state loans, includes,
therefcre, earlier loans in adjoining states which cannot be separated. Before 1949, all
FHA cut-of-state loans represent loans in adjoining states. The amount of conventional
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nearly doubling.Over two-fifths of all VA loans owned by mutual
savings; banks at the end of 1955 were out-of-state purchases. In contrast,
out-of-state FHA loans increased only slightly but at the end of 1955
represcnted close to three-fifths of all FHA loans owned by savings banks.
Entry into out-of-state mortgage markets, while of obvious advantage to
mutual savings banks, especially the larger ones, raised a number of legal
and operational problems not unlike those faced by life insurance com-
panies in the early development of their national mortgage lending pro-
The legal obstacles are, however, greater for savings banks because
of the penalties and local taxes on out-of-state business to which they might
be subject.It is usually necessary for savings banks to arrange to acquire
out-of-state mortgage investments in a way that will not be deemed as
"doing business" in a foreign state.18 The purchase of mortgages from an
out-of-state originator under an advance commitment must be done so as
not to place the originator in the position of agent for the savings bank.
Thus, "the commitment should be framed upon the assumption that the
originator has already agreed to make the mortgage loan, and not con-
ditionally upon the bank's commitment."19 Such originators are generally
referred to as "servicing contractors" with the banks, rather than as
correspondents when associated with the life insurance industry.
Many savings banks have found it convenient to acquire mortgages
from originators, not on an advance commitment basis, but after they are
completed and ready for delivery—referred to as mortgages "on the shelf."
Several large New York State savings banks acquire their out-of-state
mortgages solely through mortgage brokers, buying seasoned or completed
mortgages when ready for delivery, in accordance with inflow of deposits
and mortgage repayments. In Massachusetts, on the other hand, where a
large out-of-state mortgage investment program has developed, savings
banks seldom acquire mortgages in this manner. A central purchasing
group has been formed to act as agent for a large number of banks in the
State.Operations in the Massachusetts purchasing group have been pat-
terned closely after the life insurance company—correspondent relation-
ship. "Servicing contractors" have been selected in various regions of the
country, and association is maintained on a continuing basis.
The changing composition of postwar mortgage portfolios of mutual
savings banks, shown in Chart 25, reflects the change in investment policies
just described. The most striking development indicated by the chart
18Fora discussion of the legal problems, see Rcdfield, "Problems Facing Savings
Banks in Out-of-State Mortgage Purchases," pp. 36—41.
10Ibid.,p. 38.
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CHART25






















SOuRCE: Kiaman, Volume of Mortgage Debt, Table 19.
is the sharp increase in the proportion of VA loans held, from about one-
sixth in 1950—1951 to well over one-third by the end of 1956, while the
of FHA and conventional residential loans and those on
properties were declining or showing little change. That
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institutions.Also, unlike the experience of other financial institutions,
acquisition of VA mortgages by mutual savings banks increased almost
without: interruption through periods of both creditrestraint and
credit ease from 1951 through 1956. As a result mutual savings banks
have become the largest suppliers of funds for VA-guaranteed mort-
gages.2°
While their stature as national mortgage lenders has increased in the
postwar period, mutual savings banks have maintained their traditional
service to local mortgage markets. Many smaller banks, and even some
of the larger ones, concentrate all their mortgage lending activity in their
own local territories. The others meet local mortgage demands in full
before turning to out-of-state investments.All savings banks, whether
placing funds locally or out-of-state, invest predominantly in permanent
long-term mortgages. They originate only construction loans that will
become desirable additions to their portfolios, as permanent mortgages
on new properties.They lend also on mortgages secured by existing
properties. As Chart 25 indicates, savings banks have a large proportion
of their portfolios in mortgages secured by multifamily and commercial
properties as well as by one- to four-family homes. Loans in out-of-state
areas are chiefly on new residential projects.Multifamily mortgages,
though declining in recent years, compose a proportion of savings banks'
mortgage portfolios larger than the proportion for any other lender
throughout the postwar period.That mutual savings banks are the
largest. single source of funds for multifamily mortgages (Chapter 2)
derive; largely from their concentration in the Northeast, where most
multifamily real estate and construction are located.
In summary: In their mortgage lending policies and practices mutual
savings banks are similar to life insurance companies in that they are
important national mortgage lenders, they acquire a large part of their
mortgages indirectly through originators, and in out-of-state markets in-
vest in mortgages on new residential properties. They are similar
to savings and loan associations in their concentration on mortgages as
compared with other investments, in their primary attention to local
mortgage markets, and in their emphasis on loans secured by individual
new or existing properties in such markets. Mutual savings banks are
unlike either type of institution with respect to composition of mortgage
portfolios and shifts in that composition during the postwar period; in
location, being chiefly in the Northeast; and in techniques developed for
20Thisdevelopment has been discussed in some detail and supported statistically in
Chapter 5.
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mortgage acquisition, including purchases in the secondary market for
immediate delivery.
Savings and Loan Associations
Among institutional investors in the mortgage market, savings and loan
associations are exceptional in their essentially specialized function as
home mortgage lenders. The only other capital market instrument in
which they invest to any extent—U.S. Government obligations—has in
recent years of the postwar decade accounted for about 6 to 7 per cent of
total assets.State chartered institutions in several states are permitted to
invest in municipal obligations, but oniy a few have made such invest-
ments, and in extremely small amounts. The specialized role of savings
and loan associations, moreover, is carried through even in home mortgage
markets, where they deal directly with borrowers in rather limited local
market areas and lend predominantly on amortized conventional home
mortgages. That role has changed little since the first association was
formed over a century ago by a small group cooperating for the express
purpose of pooling funds regularly to enable the contributors to acquire
homes.2'
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
During the decades of growth and adaptation to changing patterns of
saving and lending, the savings and loan association has been transformed
from a simple form of cooperative organization, in which nearly every
shareholder was a borrower, to an institution in which saving is not
necessarily associated with borrowing.22 The change has been reflected in
i:he change of name from building societies, or homestead societies, to
savings and loan associations.Some of the earlier names, however,
including building and loan associations and cooperative banks, still
persist.
In the postwar years most savings and loan associations have competed
effectively against mutual savings banks and commercial banks for the
savings of individuals. They have been able to attract an increasingly
large share of those savings mainly because of their relatively high dividend
rate on share holdings, which in turn is based on high yields earned on
conventional home mortgage loans.Their assets have increased at a
considerably faster rate than the assets of each of the other main types of
financial intermediaries.
21H.Morton Bodfish, Savings and Loan Principles, and History of Building Societies in the
LiaiSed States, NewYork,1940.
22Colean,op. cit., p. 61.
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The extraordinary growth of savings and loan associations into one of
the leading institutional depositories and investors of savings could hardly
have been visualized by the founders. The early associations, in fact, were
not intended to be permanent institutions, but rather to be disbanded
after a1 members of the cooperatives had achieved the purpose of acquiring
homes. Associations continued to be temporary until the latter part of the
nineteenth century, when the permanent plan of organization took hold.
The plan evolved naturally from the serial type of structure, which gave an
association continuity of existence by accepting new members at frequent
intervals through the issue of shares maturing serially. By the early 1890's
the savings and loan movement had spread from the Atlantic seaboard to
the Mississippi and Ohio valleys, the Southwest, and the Far West. The
permanent plan of organization, with its separation of savers from borrow-
ers, permitted associations to increase in number and size along with the
growth of the nation.
At the same time, there was an ill-fated movement to establish "nation-
als," which actively solicited savings and made loans throughout the
country, partly through branch offices and often by mail.23 Many were
purely promotional, fraudulent ventures.Most of the legitimate ones
were poorly managed and unable to provide adequate supervision over
loans made in various areas of the country. The result was widespread
failures, hastened by the depression of 1893. By the end of the century,
national savings and loan associations were virtually out of existence,
with a loss of some $250 million to unfortunate investors.24 The spectacu-
lar failure of the "nationals" resulted in a serious setback for the entire
savings and loan movement and led ultimately to closer governmental
supervision and tighter geographic limitation of activity.25
The recovery of the industry proceeded slowly during the beginning of
the twentieth century, and received its first impetus from the housing
boom of the 1920's. While the numbers of both commercial and mutual
savings banks declined between World War I and the end of the 1920's,
the number of savings and loan associations almost doubled from 1918
to 1929, having reached a peak of more than 12,000 in 1925. Many of the
newly formed associations—small, lacking in managerial skill, and too
numerous in many areas—were unable to survive the depression of the
1930's. By 1939 there were approximately one-third fewer associations
than in 1929. The number was further reduced during World War II.
23Fora discussion of the development, operation, and demise of national savings and
loan .tssociations see Bodfish, History of Building Societies, pp. 68—82.
ibid., p. 84.
(Jolean, op. cit., p. 61.
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Since the end of the war the number of associations has been relatively
stable at around 6,000, with average asset size at the end of 1956 well over
$5 million, compared with less thanmillionthirty years earlier. This is
still much smaller than the average asset size of the other main types of
financial intermediaries.
Out of the accumulated experience of a century of success and failure,
of growth and decline, savings and loan associations have evolved into the
present-day modern type of financial institution.Its function remains the
same—providing funds for home building and purchase.It continues to
depend for its chief source of funds on the small individual saver. In every
postwar year the steady growth of share capital and mortgage repayments
have provided the bulk of funds invested in mortgages by savings and loan
associations. Occasional additional funds have come in from sales of U.S.
government obligations, chiefly in the early postwar period, and from
borrowings from the Federal Home Loan Bank System, chiefly in two
years of unusual mortgage lending activity, 1950 and 1955.
MORTGAGE LENDING POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Limited as they are in their investment outlets, savings and loan associa-
tions have less flexibility than other financial institutions have in adjusting
their mortgage flows to changing capital market conditions. Within the
mortgage market, moreover, their adjustments are limited because they are
confined through law and tradition mainly to the home mortgage market.
These limitations on investment policy have not handicapped the associ-
ations during most of the post-World War II decade, however, when strong
demands for home mortgage loans have absorbed their large inflow of
savings, and in some years have exceeded it. Through their specialization
in conventional mortgage loans with flexible interest rates savings and loan
associations gqined a further advantage, capturing a larger share of the
home mortgage market during periods of rising interest rates and yields.
At such times other lenders have reduced their funds available for federally
underwritten loans bearing fixed rates.26
Like life insurance companies and mutual savings banks, savings and
loan associations invest primarily in permanent long-term mortgage loans.
Like commercial banks, however, they also provide a large volume of
short-term construction funds, but such loans are usually a means of
obtaining long-term mortgages.Unlike life insurance companies, the
26SeeSaul B. Kiaman, "Effects of Credit and Monetary Policy on Real Estate Markets,
1952—1954," Journal of Land Economics, August 1956, pp.239—249; Chapter 5 of this book;
and "Savings and Loan Associations in the Mortgage Market," MonthlyReview of Credit
andBusiness Conditions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1956, pp. 96—99.
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associations generally have direct contact with most of their borrowers and
do not operate through correspondent or branch office organizations.
The small asset size of the associations makes less necessary out-of-state
outlets, which many savings banks need to keep their funds invested. In
their degree of concentration on conventional home mortgage loans,
savings and loan associations are unique among institutional investors.
current mortgage lending policies of the associations reflect their
early history and tradition as well as the more recent changes in mortgage
markets and the construction industry. Through the years, they have
continued to supply the largest share of mortgage funds directly to indivi-
duals acquiring new or existing houses. More recently, they have also
become important suppliers of construction funds to large-scale builders
of houses fbr sale.
Information on the amount of loans made by savings and loan associa-
tions, classified according to loans "for construction of homes" and loans
for of homes," has been available for years from the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board.Unfortunately, the precise meaning of that
classification has never been clear. A common interpretation has been
that loans for construction of homes represent permanent mortgage loans
on new houses, while loans for purchase of homes consist of mortgage loans
on existing houses.27However, conferences with Federal Home Loan
Bank Board research officials and officers of reporting associations revealed
this interpretation to be incorrect. Loans classified as for construction of
homes include temporary loans to builders as well as permanent loans
to ind.ividuals. Loans classified as for purchase of homes include loans
forpurchase of both new and existing houses. Moreover, the figures
given are confused by a significant degree of duplicationloans reported
once under the construction category are reported again under the pur-
chase category.
In an effort to determine more accurately the real nature of savings and
loan mortgage activity, a questionnaire was mailed to about 500ofthe
larger associations likely to be able to give definite information.28 The
respoases received from 55 associations in 22 states—or 11 per cent of the
sample—cannot be taken to represent precisely the characteristics of the
entire industry. The results seem worth reporting here because they throw
some light on a previously dark area, the nature of savings and loan con-
struci ion lending. The amounts of loans made by reporting associations
for construction of homes were 39 per cent of their total volume of mortgage
27SeeGrebler, Blank, and Winnick, op. cit., p. 180, note to Table 50.
28Thequestionnaire is given as Exhibit at the end of the book.
'59LENDING POLICIES OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
lending in 1955; this compares with a ratio of 35 per cent for all associa-
tions in the United States. The closeness of these two figures may be taken
as some indication of the representativeness of the associations reporting
in the survey.
Most of the reporting associations made between one-fourth and one-
half of their loans to finance home construction. There is apparently little
direct relatiohship between size of an association's mortgage portfolio and
the proportion of its new mortgage loans made for home construction, as
Table 16 shows. Associations with mortgage holdings between $10 and
TABLE 16
Savings and Loan Associations Loans for Construction of Homes, by
Size of Mortgage Portfolio, Fifty-five Reporting Associations, 1955
Size of Number
Mortgage of Proportion of LoansMade for Constructionof Homes
Portfolio Associations 0—20 21—30 3 1—40 41—50 Over50
(S millions)Reporting (per cent)
UnderlO 9 2 3 2 2
10—20 11 1 3 3 2 2
20—30 14 3 2 5 2 2
30—50 13 4 4 — 2 3
Over5O 8 3 3 2
Total 55 10 12 13 9 11
SouRcE: Questionnaire survey conducted in this study (Exhibit).
$50 million make a widely varying proportion of their loans for home
construction. The largest associations, however, with mortgage portfolios
over $50 million, reported the consistently largest proportion of loans for
home construction.
The survey indicated that in their loans for home construction, most
associations included loans to builders to finance construction operations
as well as loans to individuals to finance new home acquisition. Among
them, loans to builders generally constitute either a small or a very large
proportion of total home construction loans.Associations appear to be
either heavily or hardly at all engaged in providing builder financing.
The frequency distribution curve describing these data, therefore,is
bimodal. The relationship between size of mortgage portfolio and loans
made to builders, shown in Table 17, appears to be only a little more direct
than the relationship between size and total construction loans, shown in
Table 16. There is some evidence, however, from Table 17 that the largest
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TABLE 17
Proportion of Savings and Loan Association Home Construction Loans
Made to Builders, by Size of Mortgage Portfolio,
Fifty-five Reporting Associations, 1955
Size qf Number Proportion of Home Construction LoansMade to Builders
Mortgage of Over Not
Portfoiio Associations 0—20 21—4041—6061—80 80 Reported
(8 millions)Reporting (percent)
UnderlO 9 5 1 2 1
10—20 11 3 1 1 3 3
20—30 14 5 1 3 5
30—50 13 1 5 2 3 2
Over5O 8 — 2 2 3 1
Total 55 14 2 9 10 16 4
SOURIE: Same as Table 16.
associations tend to make a greater proportion of their construction loans
to builders than the smallest associations do.
When the proportion of construction loans to builders is related to the
proportion of total home construction loans (Table 18), a closer relation-
ship may be observed. Most of the associations originating over 40 per
cent of their loans for home construction extend well over 60 per cent of
such loans to builders. Conversely, those making less than 20 per cent of
their loans for home construction provide less than 20 per cent to builders.
The survey results throw light also upon a time-honored assumption
that savings and loan associations engage in financing builders' operations
TABLE18
Relationshipbetween Proportion of Savings and Loan Association Loans Made
to Builders and Proportion of Their Loans Made for Home Construction,
Fifty-five Reporting Associations, 1955
Proportion of Number Proportion of Home Gonsiruction Loans Made to Builders
Loans Made of Over Not
for Home Associations 0—20 2 1—4041—6061—80 80 Reported
Constriction Reporting (pcr cent)
0—20 10 6 1 1 2
21—30 12 4 2 3 1 1 1
31-40 13 4 3 1 5
41-50 9 1 1 4 3
Over50 11 1 3 6 1
Total 55 15 2 9 10 15 4
SOURCE:Sameas Table 16.
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only as a means of acquiring permanent mortgage loans, short-term
financing of such operations being not in keeping with their fundamental
purposes. Answers from the 55 associations indicate that this assumption
is true only with qualifications. A significant proportion of loans made by
savings and loan associations to builders do not lead to permanent mort-
gage loans for their portfolios.
Table 19 shows clearly that only about 45 per cent of the associations
reported that nearly all of their loans to builders—90 to 100 per cent—
resulted in permanent mortgage loans after the new buildings had been
completed and sold. An one-fourth of the associations reported
the same result for from 75 to 89 per cent of their loans to builders. Thus,
TABLE 19
Percentage of Savings and Loan Association Loans
to Builders Resulting in Permanent Mortgage















SOURCE: Same as Table 16.
about 7 out of 10 reporting institutions indicated that at least three-fourths
of their builder loans became permanent loans for their mortgage port-
folios. From another view of the data, not shown in the table, more than
two-fifths of the reporting associations indicated that over 25 per cent of
their loans to builders were refinanced upon completion of construction
by other institutions, or otherwise did not lead to permanent loans for
their portfolios.
The reasons for the outcome just described in the minority of construc-
tion loans to builders were not determined. While an association may have
expected to obtain the permanent loan, the ultimate purchaser may have
arranged for more favorable financing terms elsewhere, or may have pur-
chased without a mortgage. un other cases, the builder may have obtained
a take-out commitment from another institution before arranging with the
savings and loan association for construction financing. In any event, the
survey results as a whole suggest that, whether by intention, or circum-
stance, a significant number of savings and loan associations have been a
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source of short-term construction financing for builders as well as of long-
term financing for house buyers.
It is important to know how associations make the transition from
builder loans to permanent home purchase loans for understanding savings
and loan lending practice and proper interpretation of national statistics.
Do they make a new loan to a new owner-borrower upon completion of
construction, receiving payment in full from the builder? Or do they
simply arrange for the purchaser to assume the original loan made to the
builder? While the questions deal almost entirely with technique, they
have threct bearing upon interpretation of gross mortgage lending figures
for savings and loan associations. If the first technique is used, two loans
would be reported for financing one property—construction and purchase.
If the second, only one loan would appear in the statistics.
From the point of view of lender practice the survey findings indicate
wide differences among associations. About one-third reported that less
than 20 per cent (for the majority, less than 10 per cent) of their loans to
builders that led to permanent loans were replaced by new loans. More
than one-half reported that over 80 per cent (for the majority, over 90 per
cent)such builder loans were paid off and replaced by new permanent
loans. Thus, associations refinance either the bulk of their builder loans
or a very small proportion of them with new permanent loans. Few fall
into middle ground. The two extremes also characterize the distribution
of the proportion of builder loans made by savings and loan associations
(Table 17). In any case the reporting of two separate loans for financing
one property inevitably leads to overstatement of the volume of mortgage
lending reported for the nation's savings and loan associations.
The specialization by savings and loan associations in conventional
mortgage lending on one- to four-family houses and the stability of their
mortgage portfolio composition through most of the post-World War II
decade can be seen in Chart 26. The picture contrasts with those of the
portfolios of most other institutional investors, which showed important
shifts during the period (see Charts 23, 25, and 27). VA-guaranteed loans
played a role in the postwar portfolios of savings and loan associations
about as significant as in those of other types of institutions, except for
savings banks. This finding reveals as only half true the common generali-
zation that savings and loan associations prefer conventional to federally
underwritten loans. More accurately, they prefer conventional and VA
loans to FHA loans. The latter accounted for little more than 5 per cent
of total mortgage holdings in each of the postwar years.
What are the reasons for the unusually small volume of FHA-insured
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CHART26
Mortgage Portfolio Composition of Savings and Loan Associations,
End of Year, 1945—1956
Per centBy Type ofProperty By Type ofMortgage
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1945 '48 '50 '52 '54 '56 1945 '48 '50 '52 '54 '56
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loans in. savings and loan portfolios? One explanation may be that, while
the incentive to serve returning veterans has overcome the drawbacks in
handling VA-guaranteed loans, those drawbacks remain for FHA loans.
The small size of the associations and their lack of trained investment
personnel create difficulties in dealing with the technical complexities of
loan origination and administration.The processing delays, too, are
particularly inconvenient for savings and loan associations in their direct,
dealings with borrowers. Perhaps more basic is the fact that
the savings and loan industry has been opposed to the FHA mortgage
insurarLce program from its beginning in 1934. Its opposition was founded
originally on the belief that a program of mortgage insurance embodied a
philosophy fundamentally at odds with that of the reserve home loan bank-
ing institutions, established two years earlier, in the form of the Federal
Home Loan Bank System. Further, it felt that federal mortgage insurance
would attract more financial institutions to the mortgage lending field
(as it did) and thus increase competition for the industry.
Both the savings and loan industry and the FHA mortgage insurance
program have thrived over the past two decades or so, but the two have
never really joined hands. Most savings and loan managers continue to
avoid FHA mortgages. Some of the larger associations—the exceptions—
have broken through tradition to invest a large share of their funds in FHA
mortgages. So long as associations can continue to invest the bulk of their
funds in higher-yielding conventional mortgages, they may be expected
to invest a minimum in FHA loans.
Commercial Banks
SIGNIFICANCE OF REAL ESTATE LOANS
Commercial banks, as noted earlier, have been lending on real estate as
security almost from the beginning of their development more than two
centuries ago.Since the turn of the twentieth century, however, real
estate loans have constituted only a small proportion of total commercial
bank assets, partly because of legal restrictions on mortgage lending and
partly of the basic orientation of commercial banks towards short-
term credits. That proportion has increased for national banks since the
steady liberalization of national banking laws following the passage of the
Federal Reserve Act in 1913. Before that, participation of national banks
in real estate lending was much more restricted than that of state banks.
Since 1934, development of the federally underwritten mortgage, exempt
from most lending restrictions and readily marketable, has resulted in
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increased activity of all commercial banks in the nonfarm mortgage
market.29
Since the end of World War II, national banks have accounted for
more than one-half of the real estate loans held by all commercial banks,
compared with less than one-twentieth in 1913, and about one-third in
1935. In percentage of assets, total commercial bank real estate loans have
increased from about 7 per cent in 1939 and 3 per cent in 1945 to over
10 per cent in 1956. The postwar increase, while substantial, has left the
mortgage-to-assets ratio for commercial banks still well below that for
savings-type institutions.In addition to making long-term real estate
loans, commercial banks play a unique and important role in real estate
markets by providing short-term credits either for construction or for
interim financing. Much of this activity is not directly measurable, and a
large portion is not included statistically among commercial bank real
estate loans at
MORTGAGE LENDING POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Among the four principal types of mortgage investors, commercial banks
play the most varied role in the mortgage market. Furthermore, there is a
wider variation of mortgage lending policies and practices among commer-
cial banks than among members of the other three main groups of lending
institutions. Commercial banks provide three types of credit to the real
estate mortgage market: long-term permanent mortgage loans;short-
term construction credits;and interim financing to other real estate
mortgage lenders. In addition, some commercial banks carry on a mort-
gage company type of operation, originating loans for sale to other inves-
tors and servicing the mortgages originated and sold.
Among the country's 13,600 commercial banks, many refrain from any
type of real estate finance, many specialize in one type only, and still others
operate a broad financing program including all types of long- and short-
term real estate credit. In general, long-term financing of real estate is a
more extensive activity of the smaller country banks than of the large city
banks.Naturally, there are important exceptions.One of the main
reasons for the dominant position of commercial banks in the West Coast
29Fordescription of the liberalization of legal restrictions on commercial bank mortgage
lending and other factors influencing their expansion in the field, see Grebler, Blank, and
Winnick, op. cit., pp. 20 1—203; Behrens, op. cit., Chapter 1; and "Commercial Banks in
the Mortgage Market," Monthly Review of Credit and Business Conditions, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, April 1956, pp. 47—48.
30"Unsecuredconstruction loans and loans to real estate lenders which are either
unsecured or secured by the pledge of mortgages owned by the borrower are not classified
as real estate loans in bank condition statements." (Behrens, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 47.)
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mortgage market, for example, is the fact that the largest bank in the
country, located there, is heavily engaged in mortgage lending activity
through its many branches.3' Another of the leading banks, located in
the East, carries a large real estate mortgage portfolio in addition to
supplying a heavy volume of short-term real estate credits. With few excep-
tions, the large New York money market banks limit their real estate
credit operations almost entirely to short-term financing of construction
operations an.d of real estate mortgage lenders, or both. Large banks in
the East most extensively engaged in those two types of real estate financing
were chosen as subjects for field interviews in investigating mortgage lend-
ing poiicies and practices of commercial banks. The choice was appro-
priate because of the dominant and uniquely important role of commercial
banks as short-term real estate mortgage lenders, because of the increasing
use of credits in the postwar years, and because of the limited litera-
ture on the nature of such activities.
Short-term financing of construction operations is a highly specialized
activity and, unlike long-term real estate financing, is concen-
trated among relatively few large banks. In the early post-World War II
years many commercial banks, anxious to build up their real estate loan
portfolios, made construction loans in order to obtain permanent mort-
gages on the completed properties.32This practice became much less
common as long-term mortgage debt held by banks increased to desired
levels. The more widespread practice of commercial banks is to supply
short-term credits for construction, while permanent financing is furnished
by another institution. The concentration of construction financing among
a few banks is indicated in part by reference to 1950 data. They reveal
that, of the $840 million in construction loans outstanding as of June 30,
more than two-fifths was held by banks in the New York Federal Reserve
District. Those banks accounted for only about one-sixth of all commercial
bank real estate loans.33Evidence from interviews suggests that the
situation has changed little since then.
In the booming postwar construction market, construction lending has
been a lucrative field of investment for commercial banks.Even so,
See,for example, Paul F. Wendt and Daniel B. Rathbun, The San Francisco Bay Area
Residential Mortgage Market, Housing and Home Finance Agency, I-lousing Research Paper
No. 20: May 1952, Chapter III, especially p. 31, footnote 54.
32Ibid.,p. 28.
Data on construction loans of commercial banks were obtained from a special
supplement to the June 30, 1950 commercial bank call report. Summary results of that
report were published in the FDIC Report No. 33, Operating Insured Commercial and Mutual
Savings Banks, June 30, 1950, pp. 5—7. No later data on the subject were available at the
time of writing.
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because it is considered a highly complex, specialized, and risky kind of
operation, many of the large eastern banks have never made a construction
loan or have made only a few to accommodate correspondent banks.
Others have only recently established construction and mortgage loan
departments.34 Banks that have been successful construction lenders for
many years have acquired the skilled management and developed the
operating techniques to meet the special needs and complexities of the
construction loan market and to minimize risks associated with short-term
construction financing. The major risks are those of unavailability of
permanent mortgage financing, unsold completed properties, and un-
completed construction.
With few exceptions, commercial banks make construction loans only
after builders applying have obtained commitments elsewhere for per-
manent financing of proposed construction.These firm "take-out"
commitments assure the bank of availability of permanent mortgage
financing and of repayment of its construction loan upon satisfactory sale
of the completed property. In some instances, depending on the state of
the capital market, the construction lender may insist on "dual take-out
commitments," under which the permanent lender agrees to purchase the
builder's loans on completed but unsold properties, as well as to provide
financing for those sold to acceptable purchasers.35 This type of commit-
ment, which is not very common, relieves the bank of any risk associated
with failure to sell. Frequently, a local correspondent bank through which
loans are made (see below) will commit itself to take over loans on unsold
properties.
Where "dual take-outs" or local bank commitments are not available,
banks may reduce the risk of unsold properties in the case of residential
construction projects by requiring the builder to show executed sales
contracts for a large percentage of his proposed houses. He may then
proceed to build only at a specified rate in advance ofsales. On commercial
construction, contracts for leases are often required before funds are
advanced.
In contending with the risk of uncompleted construction, banks may
require performance or completion bonds. The chief reliance is judicious
selection of builders, close supervision of progress at the site, and payment
One of the largest New York banks which established a real estate and mortgage loan
department in 1955 gave three reasons for its action: (1) to share in what was apparently
a lucrative type of loan business, judging from operations of competitive banks;(2) to
fulfill requests of correspondent banks to participate in construction financing; and (3) to
meet the needs of local bank customers for mortgage loans.
James F. Schneider, "Construction Loans For Your Short-Term Portfolio," unpub-
.lished doctoral thesis, Graduate School of Banking, Rutgers University, June 1952.
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of construction funds at predetermined selected stages of work. Naturally,
the risk of noncompletion is least on large-scale commercial projects
involvirtg established, financially responsible real estate and construction
firms.] n the case of construction loans on multifamily properties approved
by the Federal Housing Administration, FHA insures the construction J
loanas well as the permanent loan and so relieves the commercial banksj
of most of the risk.
Most of the large eastern banks make short-term construction loans on
residential projects in participation with correspondent banks situated
throughout the country. (Loans on large-scale nonresidential.projects, in
which some banks specialize, are often handled directly.) By most arrange-
ments the large money market bank takes 80 to 90 per cent of a given loan
and the local bank the remaining percentage. The smaller banks, limited
by law in the size of loan to one borrower and by their own assets, are
precluded from assuming a larger per cent of construction loans. Only the
participation arrangements with larger banks make it possible for them to
engage in many construction financing projects.
From the standpoint of earnings those arrangements are particularly
attractive to correspondent banks. The interest rate on construction loans
has rarely been less than 5 per cent in the postwar period, and in periods
when money markets have been tight it has risen toand 6 per cent.
Usually the local correspondent bank earns a considerably higher gross
rate of return.It is generally increased by an over-ride ofof 1 per cent
on the large bank's share, toper cent (on a 90 to 10 participation basis),
or to 7 per cent (on an 80 to 20 basis). Another addition is the origination
fee (1 to 4percent) paid by the builder, usually retained by the local
bank in consideration of its work—placing the loan on the books, servicing
it, and seeing it through to completion. The resulting increases in gross
rate of return are from 10 to 11 per cent (on a 90 to 10 basis) and from 8
toper cent (80 to 20). Even after costs of loan handling and adminis-
tration, the net return for local correspondent banks exceeds that on other
types of bank loans, with the possible exception of consumer loans. Con-
sequently, banks that have developed the know-how for construction
lending generally maintain the maximum amount permitted by statute.
TheLre is apparently little relationship between a commercial bank's
willingness to engage in short-term construction financing and its willingness
to provide short-term credits to real estate mortgage lenders. Some active
construction lenders engage in little or no financing of other mortgage
originators, while others carry on extensive operations in both types of
short-term financing as well as in long-term permanent mortgage financing.
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Apart from site and location, the extent of a bank's operations in these
areas of financing depends heavily on the predilections and experience of
its officers. There is variation among them also in administration, some
banks coordinating all real estate finance activities in one department,
others maintaining separate units.
For many years, commercial banks have been in the business of ex-
tending short-term credits to mortgage loan originators, chiefly mortgage
companies, to enable them to carry mortgages in inventory for the interval
between origination and lodgment with institutions providing permanent
financing. Several variations of this type of financing, under the general
term of "warehousing," have been introduced in the postwar period. A
detailed discussion of postwar variations—which have often made for
complexity and confusion—is reserved for the following chapter. Interim
financing of mortgage lenders by commercial banks increased sharply
towards the end of the post-World War II decade in response to changes
in market conditions and operating techniques. Near the end of 1956,
commercial bank loans outstanding to real estate mortgage lenders
amounted to $1.5 billion, compared with $0.6 billion in the summer of
1954 and $0.4 billion in mid-1950.36 The bulk of these loans was extended
by large banks in New York, Boston, Chicago, and other metropolitan
centers.
Compared with the increase in interim financing loans, the expansion
in commercial bank mortgage loans held in bank portfolios has been far
less, but their volume has remained much larger. Unfortunately, data on
the volume of short-term construction financing by commercial banks are
available only for June 1950, when it was twice as large as interim loans
to mortgage lenders, but equal only to about 7 per cent of permanent
mortgage loans held in portfolio.In any event, "the strategic role of
construction loans (and of interim loans to mortgage lenders) is far greater
than is indicated merely by their outstanding amounts at any one date."
Important reasons are, "construction loans and those extended to inter-
mediate financing institutions have a relatively rapid turnover;con-
sequently, even their quantitative importance relative to the volume of
credit extended on a long-term mortgage basis is not propertly reflected
by an outstandings figure. ... Furthermore,construction loans are of
crucial importance in the real estate financing process in the sense that
they are commonly essential to the undertaking of building projects,
especially those of large scope."37
36SeeTable 20 in Chapter 7.
R. J. Saulnier, Introduction to Behrens, op. cit., p. 2.
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SouRcE: Kiaman, Volume of Mortgage Debt, Table 18.
The composition of commercial bank mortgage portfolios, which con-
sists largely of permanent long-term mortgages, has changed little during
the post-World War H decade (Chart 27).Shifts among types of mart-
gages have been smaller than in accounts of other financial institutions,
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except savings and loan associations. In contrast to portfolios of mutual
savings banks and life insurance companies, conventional home mortgage
loans have continued to form a substantially larger part of commercial
bank portfolios than either VA or FHA loans have throughout the period
of sharp postwar expansion in residential mortgage lending. This difference
reflects partly the lending policies of smaller country banks throughout
the nation that maintain close personal contact with customers, and whose
mortgage operations are similar in this respect to those of savings and loan
associations. Whether lending on federally underwritten or conventional
mortgages, however, commercial banks—large or small—make loans
directly to borrowers in local areas (sometimes through branch offices)
rather than on a nationwide basis through correspondents. The latter
method is often used in their short-berm construction lending operations.
Throughout the postwar decade, the mortgage portfolios of commercial
banks have contained a considerably smaller amount and proportion of
loans on multifamily properties than those of mutual savings banks (the
leading lender) and life insurance companies. They have also included a
rather steady and consistently smaller volume of loans on nonresidential
properties compared with the volume held by life insurance companies. In
markets for both of these income type properties, however, commercial
banks have assumed an important role as construction lenders.
Other Financial Institutions in the Mortgage Market
Among other types of private financial institutions, only the mortgage
company has played a significant role in the postwar mortgage market.
Its role is, in fact, so unique and has assumed such increasing importance
since the end of World War II that efforts were made to bring together
existing data and to obtain primary information not previously available
to describe and appraise its place in the nation's mortgage activities. The
results of this effort were published in a separate report which is sum-
marized in Chapter 8 of this book, to both of which the reader may turn
for discussion of the postwar mortgage company.38
As for other types of private institutions, those that can be separately
identified as mortgage investors—nonlife insurance companies, credit
unions, investment companies, fraternal orders, personal trust funds, and
pension funds—held a combined volume of mortgage loans amounting to
little more than $3 billion at the end of 1956, or only about 2 per cent of
the total mortgage debt outstanding.Because of the insignificance of
Kiaman, The Postwar Rise of Mortgage Companies, Occasional Paper 60, New York,
NBER, 1959.
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these miscellaneous institutions in the mortgage market, and the limita-
tions on time and resources, no effort was made to appraise their mortgage
lending policies.For many of them, barriers to increased mortgage
investment exist in the form of legal restrictions and complexities, cumber-
someness of the mortgage instrument compared with other capital market
instruments, inadequate organization for mortgage acquisition, and
gencra. prejudices and lack of knowledge about mortgage markets. At
the end of 1956 little more than 2 per cent of the $120 billion in assets
owned by noninsured pension funds, personal trust funds, fraternal orders,
credit unions, and nonlife insurance companies was invested in mortgages.39
Perhaps the liveliest expectations for expanded mortgage market par-
ticipati.on among these institutions have been expressed for pension funds.
Those funds, in some views, will, in exploring outlets for ever-increasing
treasuries, become attracted to the investment advantages of federally
underwritten mortgages both from the standpoint of risk and of yield.
The Mortgage Bankers Association of America not long ago established
a committee to study pension fund characteristics.Several mortgage
companies have acted to sponsor an organization established specifically
to meet mortgage origination and servicing problems for pension funds
and similar potential investors.Evidence of increased interest in mort-
gages on the part of pension funds can be found. Between the end of 1954
and 11)56 those funds doubled their mortgage investments from $140 to
$285 million—a much more rapid absolute and relative increase than
other types of miscellaneous institutions undertook.
Even so, most pension fund administrators and students of pension fund
operations foresee no great growth in mortgage investment. They argue
that the relatively risk-free status of FHA and VA loans is not a controlling
consideration. High-grade corporate bonds are just as likely to be paid at
maturity. Moreover, the increased liquidity offederally underwritten mort-
gages through regular amortization is of no interest to the pension fund
manager. He has no need for liquidity; rather, with the rapid growth of
pension funds;, the return flow of investment funds often creates new
problems of selecting investment outlets.
The question of yield is of course basic, but yield is subject to many
modifications. Administrative and servicing costs associated with a mort-
gage portfolio, higher in comparison with those for a corporate securities
portfolio, narrow any market yield differential in favor of mortgages.
The demonstrated present and potential future capital gains of a common
Estimates of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow-of-Funds
Unit; and National Bureau of Economic Research, Postwar Capital Market Study.
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stock portfolio have attracted an increasingly large share of pension fund
investments into equities. Because of long-term orientation, interim price
fluctuations are of small concern to administrators.Finally, just as life
insurance companies and other large financial institutions are, pension
funds are reluctant to be involved in real estate foreclosure action, even
though capital losses in the case of FHA and VA loans are limited.40
40Thediscussion of why pension funds are not likely to become an important source of
mortgage investment leans heavily upon the views of Roger F. Murray. See, for example,
his "Pension Funds as a Market for Mortgages," Savings and Mortgage Supply, Proceedings
of the Eighth Annual Conference of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, 1953.
The National Bureau of Economic Research began in 1958, under Murray's direction,
a research program on the impact of public and private pension systems on saving and
investment. Plans for the study are outlined in the National Bureau's Thirty-ninth Annual
Report, May 1959, pp. 63—68.
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